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Abstract— We study the interaction between a network
designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The
network consists of nodes performing continuous-time dis-
tributed averaging. The goal of the network designer is to
assist the nodes reach consensus by changing the weights of
a limited number of links in the network. Meanwhile, an
adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent the
nodes from converging. We formulate two problems to describe
this competition where the order in which the players act is
reversed in the two problems. We utilize Pontryagin’s Maximum
Principle (MP) to tackle both problems and derive the optimal
strategies. Although the canonical equations provided by the
MP are intractable, we provide an alternative characterization
for the optimal strategies that highlights a connection with
potential theory. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition for
the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium (SPE) for this zero-
sum game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various physical and biological phenomena where global
patterns of behaviour stem from local interactions have been
modelled using linear averaging dynamics. In such dynamics
an agent updates its value as a linear combination of the
values of its neighbors. Averaging dynamics is the basic
building block in many multi-agent systems, and it is widely
used whenever an application requires multiple agents, who
are graphically constrained, to synchronize their measure-
ments. Examples include formation control, coverage, dis-
tributed estimation and optimization, and flocking [1]–[3].
Besides engineering, linear averaging finds applications in
other fields. For instance, social scientists use averaging to
describe the evolution of opinions in networks [4].
In practice, communication among agents is prone to
different non-idealities which can affect the convergence
properties of distributed algorithms. Transmission delays [5],
noisy links [6], [7], and quantization [8] are some examples
of non-idealities that are due to the physical nature of the
application. In addition to physical restrictions, researchers
have also studied averaging dynamics in the presence of
malicious nodes in the network [9], [10]. Various algorithms
that guarantee resilience against node failures have been
proposed in the literature [11].
In [12], we explored the effect of an external adversary
who attempts to prevent the nodes from reaching consensus
by disconnecting certain links in the network. We derived his
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optimal strategy and demonstrated that it admits a potential-
theoretic analogy. Here, we introduce a network designer that
attempts to counter the effect of the adversary and help the
nodes reach consensus by changing the weights of certain
links. Both the adversary and the designer are constrained by
their physical properties, e.g., battery life and communication
range. To capture such constraints, we allow the adversary
and the designer to affect only a fixed number of links.
Such an interaction between a network designer and an
adversary can occur in various practical applications. For
example, in a wireless network, the adversary can be a
jammer who is capable of breaking links by injecting high
noise signals that disrupt the communication among nodes.
The link weights in such a network represent the capacities
of the corresponding links. The designer can modify the
capacity of a certain link using various communication
techniques such as introducing parallel channels between two
nodes as in orthogonal frequency division multiple access
(OFDMA) networks [13].
Our model is different from the current literature in two
ways: (i) the adversary and the designer compete over a
dynamical network. This is different from the problems
studied in the computer science and economics communities
where the network is usually static [14]; (ii) the players in
our model are constrained and cannot operate with an infinite
budget. This enables us to model practical scenarios more
closely rather than allowing the malicious behaviour to be
unrestricted as in [9], [15], [16].
The main goal of this work is to derive optimal strategies
for the designer and the adversary who have conflicting
objectives. Because the order in which the players act affects
the resulting utilities, we formulate two problems based on
the order of play, allowing each player to have the first-move-
advantage in one of the problems. When the adversary is
allowed to play first, he is capable of restricting the available
actions of the designer since some links will disappear from
the network. Hence, if we were to cast a zero-sum game
between the players, one should not expect the existence
of a saddle-point equilibrium (SPE) in pure strategies. The
question we would like to answer is then: are there scenarios
where the order of play does not affect the utilities of the
players, which leads to the existence of an SPE?
Accordingly, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We capture the interaction between the designer and the
adversary by formulating two problems. In the min–
max problem, the designer declares a strategy first to
which the adversary reacts by its optimal response. The
second problem is a max–min one where the order of
play is reversed. We derive the optimal strategies in both
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problems by employing the Maximum Principle (MP).
• We provide a method to compute the optimal strategies
without requiring the adjoint equations to be solved.
This method provides a new characterization for the
optimal strategies in terms of potential-theoretic quan-
tities.
• We derive a sufficient condition guaranteeing the exis-
tence of an SPE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we formulate and provide the preliminaries of the min–
max and max–min problems. We analyze both problems in
Section III and derive their solutions. An implementation
method is provided in Section IV. We provide a sufficient
condition for the existence of an SPE in Section V, and we
conclude the paper in Section VI. An Appendix contains two
lemmas used in the derivation of the sufficient condition.
Notation: We denote the set of edges in a graph G by E(G).
When clear from the context, we will drop the argument of
any set defined on a graph. To emphasize the effect of link
removal by the adversary, we will sometimes write G(u(t))
to denote the graph resulting after the adversary acts at time
t. We will use
∑
j>i(.) to mean
∑n
j=2
∑j−1
i=1 (.).
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a connected network of n nodes described by an
undirected graph G with n vertices and m edges. We will
denote an edge in E(G) between nodes i and j by {i, j}.
The value, or state, of the nodes at time instant t is given
by x(t) = [x1(t), ..., xn(t)]T . The nodes start with an initial
value x(0) = x0, and they are interested in computing the
average of their initial measurements xavg = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi(0)
via local averaging. We consider the continuous-time aver-
aging dynamics given by
x˙(t) = A(t)x(t), x(0) = x0, (1)
where the matrix A(t) has the following properties
A(t) = A(t)T , Aij(t) ≥ 0 i 6= j, A(t)1 = 0.
Define x¯ = 1xavg and let M = 11
T
n . A well-known result
states that, given the above assumptions, the nodes will
reach consensus as t → ∞, i.e., limt→∞ x(t) = x¯ [1].
In the absence of the adversary and the network designer,
A(t) is time-invariant with Aij(t) = aij . To achieve their
respective objectives, the designer and the adversary control
the elements of A(t) as we explain next.
The adversary attempts to slow down convergence by
breaking at most ` ≤ m links at each time instant.
Let uij(t) ∈ {0, 1} be the weight the adversary as-
signs to link {i, j}. He breaks link {i, j} at time t
when uij(t) = 1. His control is given by u(t) =
[u12(t), u13(t), ..., u1n(t), u23(t), ..., u(n−1)n(t)]T . We will
denote the number of links the adversary breaks at time t
by Nu(t). In accordance with the above, the strategy space
of the adversary is
U =
{
u ∈ {0, 1}(n2) : Nu ≤ `
}
.
Meanwhile, the network designer attempts to accelerate
convergence by controlling the weights of the edges. Let
v(t) = [v12(t), v13(t), ..., v1n(t), v23(t), ..., v(n−1)n(t)]T be
the control of the designer. The designer can change the
weight of a given link by adding vij(t) to its weight aij . We
assume that vij(t) ∈ [0, b] and that the number of links the
designer modifies Nv(t) is at most `. The strategy set of the
designer is therefore
V =
{
v ∈ [0, b](n2) : Nv ≤ `
}
.
If {i, j} /∈ E , then uij(t) = vij(t) = 0 for all t. Given the
above definitions, we can write the {i, j}-th element of the
matrix A(u(t), v(t)) as
Aij(u(t), v(t)) = (aij + vij(t)) · (1− uij(t)).
Implicit in this definition is the assumption that the effect
of the adversary and the designer on the links lasts only
instantly, and the weights of the links are reset to aij at the
next time instant. This is motivated by applications where
the state of a channel deteriorates only when the adversary
is acting, e.g., wireless communications where the effect of
the jammer is not permanent.
Define the following functional:
J(u, v) =
∫ T
0
k(t) |x(t)− x¯|2 dt,
where the kernel k(t) is positive and integrable over [0, T ].
The utility of the adversary is then given by J(u, v), and
that of the designer is −J(u, v). We will study the following
two problems. In the first problem, the adversary acts first
by selecting the links he is interested in breaking. Then, the
network designer optimizes his choices over the resulting
graph G(u(t)). More formally, we have
max
u(t)∈U
min
v(t)∈V
J(u, v)
s.t. x˙(t) = A(u(t), v(t))x(t), x(0) = x0.
In the second problem, the order is reversed, and the
designer acts first:
min
v(t)∈V
max
u(t)∈U
J(u, v)
s.t. x˙(t) = A(u(t), v(t))x(t), x(0) = x0.
In a computer network, where consensus could model the
spread of a virus, the max–min problem allows the network
architect (who is the maximizer here) to implement networks
that are robust against a strategic virus diffusion. The min–
max problem finds applications in army combat situations
where the designer (the minimizer) attempts to counter the
attacks of the enemy to disrupt the communications among
agents. In both problems, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The initial matrix A(0, 0), the state x(t),
and the value b are common information to both players.
The following two remarks are in order.
Remark 1: (Problem Complexity) Let us consider the
problem of the adversary for a given strategy of the designer.
Assume that the adversary can act in K time instances over
the interval [0, T ]. Then, for small `, the total number of
links that need to be tested in a brute-force approach is(
m
`
)K
≈ m`K . (2)
Clearly, the brute-force approach incurs exponential-time
complexity, especially if any of m, `, k becomes large. The
same argument applies to the network designer.
Remark 2: (Non-Rectangular Strategies) When the strat-
egy sets are rectangular, i.e., the strategy of one player does
not restrict the strategy space of the other, the following holds
V = max
u(t)∈U
min
v(t)∈V
J(u, v) ≤ min
v(t)∈V
max
u(t)∈U
J(u, v) = V ,
(3)
where V , V are called the lower and upper values of the
game, respectively. An SPE in pure strategies exists when
V = V . When the strategy spaces are non-rectangular, one
should not expect the existence of an SPE in pure-strategies
nor the order in (3). In the max–min problem, the adversary
restricts the strategy space of the designer since u(t) removes
links from G. Hence, the max–min and min–max problems
should be studied separately.
III. ADVERSARY VS. NETWORK DESIGNER: TWO
PROBLEMS
We will now present the solutions for the two problems
presented above. To arrive at the optimal strategies of the
players, we employ the MP. In Section IV, we prove that
N?u = N
?
v = `; we will use this fact in the proofs of this
section. In what follows, we will often drop the time index
and other arguments for notational simplicity.
A. The Min–Max Problem
The Hamiltonian associated with the max–min problem is:
H(x, p, u, v) = k(t) |x(t)− x¯|2 + pT (t)A(t)x(t).
The first-order necessary conditions for optimality are:
p˙ = − ∂
∂x
H
= −2k(x− x¯)−Ap, p(T ) = 0 (4)
x˙ = Ax, x(0) = x0 (5)
(u?, v?) = arg max arg min {H : u ∈ U , v ∈ V} ,
where x, p ∈ C1[0, T ], the space of continuously differen-
tiable functions over [0, T ].
To find the optimal strategies, let us first write
pTAx =
n∑
i=1
pi
 n∑
j=1
Aijxj

=
n∑
i=1
pi
− n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Aijxi +
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Aijxj

=
∑
j>i
(aij + vij)(1− uij)(pj − pi)(xi − xj).
Define the function
fij = (pj − pi)(xi − xj),
and let us write
max
u∈U
min
v∈V
H = max
u∈U
min
v∈V
k |x− x¯|2 + pTAx
= k |x− x¯|2 + max
u∈U
min
v∈V
∑
j>i
Aijfij . (6)
Note that we cannot decouple the maximization (or mini-
mization) into
(
n
2
)
maximization problems, each correspond-
ing to a link or a single term inside the double summation.
This is due to the constraint on the number of links that
can be targeted by the players. Before finding the optimal
strategies, let us first define the following sets. Let F(G′) =
{fij < 0 : {i, j} ∈ E(G′)} for some graph G′. It should
be noted that although {i, j} and {j, i} belong to E(G′),
we only include fij once in F(G′), i.e., we treat {i, j}
and {j, i} as one link. This applies to all the definitions
to follow. Let Fpi(G′) be a ranking of the set F(G′) such
that Fpi,1(G′) ≤ . . . ≤ Fpi,|F(G′)|(G′). Further, let F`pi(G′)
be the set containing the smallest ` values in Fpi(G′). It is
understood that if Fpi(G′) contains fewer than ` negative
elements, F`pi will contain all those elements. Define the
set operator Φi : S(G′) → E(G′) that returns the links
in E(G′) that correspond to the elements of S(G′). Also,
define Φi : S(G′) → E(G′) that returns the links in E(G′)
corresponding to the smallest i elements of the set S(G′).
When |S(G′)| < i, Φi(S(G′)) = Φ(S(G′)). We also adopt
the convention Φ0(.) = {∅}. We can then write
F`pi(G′) = Φ` ({fij ≤ Fpi,`+1(G′) : {i, j} ∈ E(G′)}) .
Define the sets D1(G′) = {aijfij < 0 : {i, j} ∈ E(G′)},
D2(G′) = {(aij + b)fij < 0 : {i, j} ∈ E(G′)}, and D(G′) =
D1(G′) ∪ D2(G′). Also, let Dpi(G′) be a ranking of D(G′)
such that Dpi,1(G′) ≤ . . . ≤ Dpi,|D(G′)|(G′). Finally, define
D`pi(G′) = Φ`({aijfij ≤ Dpi,`+1(G′) or
(aij + b)fij ≤ Dpi,`+1(G′) : {i, j} ∈ E(G′)}).
The following theorem specifies the optimal strategies of
the adversary and the designer.
Theorem 1: The optimal strategies for the network de-
signer and the adversary in the max–min problem are
v?ij(t) =
 b, {i, j} ∈ F
`
pi(G?)
0, {i, j} /∈ F`pi(G?) or fij > 0
[0, b], otherwise
u?ij(t) =
 1, {i, j} ∈ D
`
pi(G)
0, {i, j} /∈ D`pi(G) or fij > 0
{0, 1}, otherwise
where G? = G(u?) is the graph resulting after the adversary
applies u?.
Proof: For both strategies, when fij = 0, the MP does
not tell us what the optimal action is. Hence, both players
can select any action from their strategy spaces in this case,
provided they do not exceed their budget constraints. Let us
start by deriving v?. By (6), the terms aijfij do not affect
the minimization problem. Also, note that G? contains the
links for which u∗ij = 0 only. Then, we can write
argmin
v∈V
∑
j>i
Aijfij = argmin
v∈V
∑
j>i
{i,j}∈E(G?)
vijfij . (7)
Now consider the sum on the right hand side. Being a
minimizer, the designer should not amplify the positive fij’s;
hence, he must set v?ij = 0 when fij > 0. Then, by recalling
the definition of F`pi(G?), we obtain∑
j>i
{i,j}∈E(G?)
vijfij =
∑
j>i
{i,j}∈F`pi(G?)
vijfij +
∑
j>i
{i,j}/∈F`pi(G?)
vijfij
≥
∑
j>i
{i,j}∈F`pi(G?)
bfij .
Note that the last inequality can indeed be achieved because
|F`pi(G?)| ≤ `. Hence, the optimal v? is as claimed.
In this problem, the adversary has the first-mover-
advantage and needs to dispose of the links that can reduce
his utility. Because the adversary attempts to maximize the
minimum of pTAx, it follows that u?ij = 0 when fij > 0. Let
us now consider the links with fij < 0. The adversary knows
that the designer attempts to make the negative fij’s smaller
by adding b to the corresponding edge weights. However,
we cannot rule out the possibility that (alk + b)flk > aijfij .
Hence, the adversary is not only interested in finding the
smallest negative (aij + b)fij’s, but also needs to consider
the aijfij’s themselves. It follows that the adversary needs
to find the terms that can become very small (negative) and
set uij = 1 to the corresponding links. But those links are
exactly the ones included in D`pi(G). Formally, and using the
notation A∗ij = (aij + v
?
ij)(1− uij), we have∑
j>i
A?ijfij =
∑
j>i
{i,j}∈D`pi(G)
A?ijfij +
∑
j>i
{i,j}/∈D`pi(G)
A?ijfij
≤
∑
j>i
{i,j}/∈D`pi(G)
(aij + v
?
ij)fij ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that fij < 0
for all {i, j} ∈ D`pi(G). This confirms that u? is as claimed.
B. The Min–Max Problem
We now study the min–max problem. Similar to the above,
we can write
min
v∈V
max
u∈U
H = k |x− x¯|2 + min
v∈V
max
u∈U
∑
j>i
Aijfij .
We again note that one needs to be careful to observe that the
minimization (or maximization) problem does not decouple
due to the constraint on the controls of the two players.
Although the adversary’s strategy can be derived using an
approach similar to the previous problem, the designer’s
strategy requires more care. Let L(v) = {(aij + vij)fij <
TABLE I
ALGORITHM I: COMPUTING THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR THE
MINIMIZER IN THE MIN–MAX PROBLEM.
0: input: a strategy v with Nv = 0
1: for i = ` ↓ 1
2: if ∃S ⊂ P(0), |S| = i, L`pi,i(0) /∈ L`pi(vS(b))
3: Set vij = b, ∀{i, j} ∈ Φ(S)∪Φ`−i
(P(vS(b))).
4: Exist for loop.
5: end
6: end
7: if Nv = 0
8: Set vij = b for all {i, j} ∈ Φ`
(P(0)).
9: end
0 : {i, j} ∈ E(G)}. Define Lpi(v) to be a ranking of the set
L(v) such that Lpi,1(v) ≤ . . . ≤ Lpi,|L|(v), and the set
L`pi(v) = Φ` ({(aij + vij)fij ≤ Lpi,`+1(G) : {i, j} ∈ E(G)}) .
As an abuse of notation, we let L`pi,k(v) correspond to the
value (aij + vij)fij associated with the link {i, j} ∈ L`pi(v).
We assume that L`pi,1(v) ≥ . . . ≥ L`pi,`(v). Further, define
the sets P(v) = {aijfij < 0 : {i, j} /∈ L`pi(v)} such that
P1(v) ≤ . . . ≤ P|P|(v) and P(v) = {fij < 0 : {i, j} /∈
L`pi(v)} such that P1(v) ≤ . . . ≤ P |P|(v). We also define
[vS(b)]ij =
{
b, {i, j} ∈ S
0, {i, j} /∈ S
The following theorem specifies the optimal strategies of
both players.
Theorem 2: The optimal strategy for the adversary in the
min–max problem is
u?ij(t) =
 1, {i, j} ∈ L
`
pi(v
?)
0, {i, j} /∈ L`pi(v?) or fij > 0
{0, 1}, otherwise
For the network designer, the optimal strategy is to run
Algorithm I and set v?ij = 0 when fij > 0 and v
?
ij ∈ [0, b] if
fij = 0.
Proof: The same reasoning as in Thm 1 applies to the
case when fij ≥ 0. We start by deriving u?. By recalling the
definition of L`pi(v?), we can write∑
j>i
A?ijfij =
∑
j>i
{i,j}∈L`pi(v?)
A?ijfij +
∑
j>i
{i,j}/∈L`pi(v?)
A?ijfij
≤
∑
j>i
{i,j}/∈L`pi(v?)
(aij + v
?
ij)fij ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that fij < 0
for all {i, j} ∈ L`pi(v?). This confirms that u? is as claimed.
Also, note that the last inequality can be achieved because
|L`pi(v?)| ≤ ` by construction.
As for the designer, he can now exploit the first-mover-
advantage since he is acting first. The main goal of the
designer in this case is to try to protect the links in L`pi(0).
These links will be disconnected by the adversary unless the
designer is able to modify the ranking of the links such that
Positive fij ’s P(0) L`⇡(0)
+b
Fig. 1. A demonstration of how the designer can alter the ranking of the
fij ’s to improve his utility.
the links (or a subset of them) in L`pi(0) are not in L`pi(v?).
In essence, this is what Algorithm I attempts to achieve.
This is demonstrated in Fig. 1. Being the lowest negative
value, and hence the link both the adversary and the designer
are interested in, let us explore how the designer can push
L`pi,`(0) higher in the ranking of the link values. The designer
can achieve this if under some strategy v, the value L`pi,`(0) is
no longer among the lowest ` negative values; in other words,
the designer can alter the ranking if there is a set of ` links
S ⊂ P(0) such that when he sets vij = b for all links in
S, there will be ` values that are smaller than L`pi,`(0) (steps
2 and 3 in Algorithm I). The adversary will then break the
links in S and will spare the link corresponding to L`pi,`(0)
as required. To see why this is optimal, consider the type of
links that can be in S.
• If a link in S is also in L`pi(0), then this is optimal due
to the fact that the adversary will disconnect that link
since it is in L`pi(0). Hence, if the designer can utilize
this link to modify the ranking and protect a link that is
more negative (L`pi,`(0) in this case), then this can only
improve his utility. The same reasoning applies if more
than one of the links in S are also in L`pi(0).
• If none of the links in S is in L`pi(0), then necessarily
some of the links in L`pi(0) will also be protected along
with the link corresponding to L`pi,`(0). This is because
|S| = `, and the adversary can only break ` links.
Hence, this scenario is more favorable to the designer
than the previous one and can therefore only improve
his utility.
If such an S exists, then the designer has exhausted all
possible moves, since |S| = `, and the algorithm terminates
(step 4 of the algorithm). Otherwise, If no such set exists in
P(0), then the designer should try to protect the next most
negative link whose value is precisely L`pi,`−1(0) by finding
a set S of of size `−1. Since L`pi,`−1(0) ≥ L`pi,`(0), the link
corresponding to L`pi,`(0) along with S will constitute the set
of ` links that the adversary will break. Then, the designer
should set vij = b for all the links in S, and for the remaining
action the designer should select the link with the most
negative fij that is not in L`pi(vS(b)); this is precisely the set
Φ1
(P(vS(b))) (step 3 of the algorithm). The reason behind
searching in P(vS(b)) and not in P(vS(b)) after finding S
is that the aij’s only affect the utility of the designer when
he attempts to alter the ranking. Otherwise, the edge weights
do not affect the utility of the minimizer as per (7).
This procedure then repeats until the designer has tried
to protect all the links in L`pi(0). If the designer fails in
protecting all the links in L`pi(0), then we must have Nv = 0,
i.e., the input strategy was not altered. Then, the optimal
strategy is to set vij = b for the links with most negative
fij’s in P(0) (steps 7 and 8 in Algorithm I).
C. Complexity of the Optimal Strategies
Let us now study the complexity of the optimal strategies.
We first start by the max–min problem. Assuming as in
Remark 1 that the players switch their strategies a total of K
times over [0, T ], we conclude that the worst-case complexity
of the strategy of both players is O(K · m logm) as their
strategies involve merely the ranking of sets of size at most
2m. As for the min–max problem, the complexity of the
adversary’s strategy is O(K ·m logm). The main bottleneck
in the strategy of the designer is step 2 in Algorithm I. The
size of the set P(0) is at most m − `; thus, the worst-
case complexity for the designer is K · ∑m−`i=1 (m−`i ) ≈
K ·∑`i=1(m − `)i. By comparison with (2), we conclude
that the derived optimal strategies achieve vast complexity
reductions.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
The optimal strategies we derived in Section III are defined
in terms fij’s which depend on the state x(t) and the costate
p(t). However, we have not derived the optimal trajectories
that satisfy the canonical equations given by the MP in (4)
and (5). Since the system is linear time-varying, the solutions
will be given in terms of a state transition matrix; this makes
working with fij intractable. The following theorem provides
a procedure to arrive at the optimal solutions without the
need to compute p(t). Parts of the proof of this theorem
appeared in [12]. Define νij = −(xi − xj)2.
Theorem 3: The rankings performed as part of the opti-
mal strategies of the max–min and min–max problems can
be carried out by replacing fij(t) by νij(t). Further, it is
optimal for the players to modify a total of ` links.
Proof: We will provide the main ideas behind proving
this claim for the max–min problem – the same arguments
will apply to the min–max problem. For a fixed strategy of
the adversary u?, we will show that it is optimal for the
minimizer to rank the links based on their νij values instead
of the fij’s. Then, by applying the same reasoning as in Thm
1, we arrive at u? with the ranking performed using νij .
The main complication in solving the adjoint equations is
that the system is time-varying. However, since x(t), p(t) ∈
C1[0, T ], the value of fij cannot change abruptly in a finite
interval. As a result, the control obtained from the MP cannot
switch infinitely many times in a finite interval. Hence, we
can regard the system as a time-invariant one over a small
interval [t0, t0 + δ] ⊂ [0, T ], δ > 0. The proof consists of
three steps.
1. Show that it is optimal for the players to change ` links.
2. Show that, over a small interval [t0, t0+δ], it is optimal
for the designer to switch from a strategy vA to a
strategy vB that entails ranking the links based on their
νij values.
3. Show that mimicking vA for the remaining time of the
problem preserves the gain obtained over [t0, t0 + δ].
The first step was proven in [12] for the maximization
problem. In the min–max (or max–min) case, the proof
remains the same. This is because for a fixed u?, then by
Thm 1 in [12], it follows that it is optimal for the designer
to modify ` links1. By Thm 1, we deduce that Nu? = `.
We want to show that the designer will modify the ` links
with the lowest νij values. Assume that the designer applies
a stationary strategy vA over the interval [t0, t0 + δ] with a
corresponding system matrix A. Let P (t) := eAt. Due to
the structure of A, P (t) is a doubly stochastic matrix for
t ≥ 0. Because the control strategies are time-invariant, the
state trajectory is given by
x(t) = eA(t−t0)x(t0), t ∈ [t0, t0 + δ].
Assume that the links the designer modifies over this interval
are not the ones with the lowest νij values. In particular,
assume that the designer sets vAij = 0 and v
B
kl = b although
νij < νkl. At time t? ∈ [t0, t0 + δ], we assume that the
designer switches to strategy vB by setting vBij = b and v
B
kl =
0. Let the matrix B be the system matrix corresponding to
vB , and define the doubly stochastic matrix Q(t) := eBt,
t ≥ 0. Showing that this switch can improve the utility of
the designer is equivalent to proving the following inequality
[12]: ∫ t0+δ
t?
k(t) · x(t0)TΛ(t, t?)x(t0)dt < 0, (8)
where Λ(t, t?) = P (t?−t0)Q(2(t−t?))P (t?−t0)−P (2(t−
t0)). A sufficient condition for (8) to hold is
h(t, x(t0)) = x(t0)
TΛ(t, t?)x(t0) < 0, for t > t?.
As t ↓ 0, we can write P (t) = I + tA + O (t2), where
O (t2) /t ≤ L for some finite constant L. Following similar
steps to those in [12], we can write
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t− t?)
∑
r>s
(Asr −Bsr) (xr(t0)− xs(t0))2
= 2b(t− t∗)(νij(t0)− νkl(t0)) +O(δ2).
For small enough δ, the higher order terms are dominated
by the first term. Hence, if there are links {i, j} and {k, l}
such that νij ≤ νkl, there exists t? such that h(t, x(t0)) < 0
for t ∈ (t?, t0 + δ]. This proves that the optimal strategy for
the designer is to break the links with the lowest νij values.
By comparison with the statement of Thm 1, we conclude
that we can replace fij by νij while performing the required
rankings.
The final step of the proof is to show that switching to
strategy B guarantees an improved utility for the adversary
regardless of how the original trajectory A changes beyond
time t0 + δ. To this end, we will assume that from time
t0 + δ onward, strategy B will mimic strategy A. Assume
that strategy A switches to another strategy C starting at time
1Conditions were given in [12] as to when it is also optimal for a player
to change less than ` links.
tt?t0 t0 +   t0 + 2 
A (u?1, v1) A (u
?
2, v2)
A (u?1, v
?
1) A (u
?
2, v2)
Fig. 2. A demonstration of the technique used in the third step of the
proof.
t0 + δ. Hence, strategy B will also switch to strategy C, but
the trajectories will have a different initial conditions. Fig. 2
illustrates this idea. Consider the behavior of the system over
[t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ] over which we can assume that the system
is time-invariant. One can show that it suffices to prove that
[17] ∫ t0+2δ
t0+δ
k(t) · c(t)dt < 0,
where c(t) is the difference between the utilities resulting
from the trajectory that includes a switch to strategy B at
time t? and the one that does not switch at time t?. After
performing a first-order Taylor expansion, c(t) can be shown
to be equal to [17]
c(t) = 2b (t0 + δ − t?) (νij(t0)− νkl(t0)) +O(δ2),
which is negative for small δ. Hence, the gain that was
obtained by switching to strategy B at time t? is preserved
and the proof is complete.
Remark 3: (Potential-Theoretic Analogy) As discussed in
[12], when the graph is viewed as an electrical network,
aij+vij can be viewed as the conductance of link {i, j} and
xi−xj as the potential difference across the link. Therefore,
the optimal strategy of the designer in both problems involves
finding the links with the highest potential difference (or
the lowest νij’s) and increasing the conductance of those
links by setting vij = b. This leads to increasing the
power dissipation across those links, which translates to
increasing the information flow across the network and
results in faster convergence. The optimal strategy of the
adversary should therefore involve breaking the links with
highest power dissipation. But power dissipation is given by
(aij + vij)(xi− xj)2, and this is exactly what the adversary
targets according to Thm 3.
V. A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE EXISTENCE OF
AN SPE
Having solved the min–max and max–min problems, it
remains to verify whether the value of these problems can
be equal, even though the strategy sets of the players are
non-rectangular. The reason that the upper and lower values
are different is mainly due to the ability of the minimizer
to deceive the maximizer by altering the ranking of the
most negative values. If we remove this ability from the
network designer, we should expect that an SPE would exist.
The following theorem makes this argument formal. Define
γ := M2 , where M ,  are defined in Lemmas 1 and 2 in the
Appendix. We assume that  is chosen to guarantee γ > 1.
Theorem 4: A sufficient condition for the upper and
lower values V , V , defined in (3) to be equal, and hence
for the existence of an SPE, is to select b such that
0 ≤ b ≤ min
{i,j},{k,l}∈E
|γaij − akl| , (9)
given that aij 6= akl and aij > γakl whenever aij > akl, for
all {i, j}, {k, l} ∈ E .
Proof: It suffices to show that L`pi(v?) = L`pi(0) =
D`pi(G?) as this would imply that the adversary would break
the same links whether he acts first or second, and as a result
the strategy of the minimizer in both problems will be the
same. This would occur if the minimizer cannot protect any
of the links in L`pi(0). In other words, this will occur if the
minimizer cannot satisfy the condition in step 2 of Algorithm
I for any 1 ≤ i ≤ `. A sufficient condition for this to happen
is to require
min
{i,j}∈P(0)
(aij + b)fij > max{i,j}∈L`pi(0)
aijfij .
This implies that no matter how the designer changes the
weights of the links in P(0), it cannot make those links more
negative than the links in L`pi(0). To satisfy this inequality,
we will establish that whenever aijfij > aklfkl, fij , fkl < 0,
we must have (aij + b)fij > aklfkl, for all links in E . We
can then re-write the condition on b as
b ≤ aijfij − aklfkl−fij = akl
|fkl|
|fij | − aij . (10)
Consider the following two cases. If fkl ≥ fij , then we
must have akl > aij . Then, by assumption we have that
akl > γaij . By Lemmas 1 and 2, we can write
akl
|fkl|
|fij | − aij ≥
1
γ
akl − aij > 0. (11)
Next, consider the case when fij > fkl. In this case, aij can
be greater or smaller than akl. However, if aij > akl, and
recalling that aijfij > aklfkl, then
γakl < aij < akl
|fkl|
|fij | ≤ γakl,
which is a contradiction. The case akl = aij is excluded by
assumption. Hence, in this case, we must have aij < akl,
and the inequality in (11) applies. Thus, by choosing b as in
(9), we obtain the condition we are seeking. Note that we do
not need to consider the case when aijfij = aklfkl since the
players will be indifferent as to which link to choose when
the corresponding values are equal.
Remark 4: The condition derived in the above theorem
requires the network to be sufficiently diverse in the sense
that the weights of the links have to be not only different
from each other, but also a factor γ apart. This is due to the
fact that we were seeking uniform bounds on the fij’s. If we
allow b to vary with time, then one can find less restrictive
conditions to ensure the existence of an SPE. However, this
would require (10) to be verified at each time instant. Further,
the bounds derived in the Appendix are loose. Tighter bounds
could be given by studying the dynamics of |fkl|/|fij |.
However, studying the time derivative of this ratio is not
tractable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated and solved two problems
that capture the competition between an adversary and a
network designer in a dynamical network. We considered
practical models for the players by constraining their actions
along the problem horizon. The derived strategies were
shown to exhibit a low worst-case complexity. We also
proved that the optimal strategies admit a potential-theoretic
analogy, and they can be implemented without needing to
solve the adjoint equations. Finally, we showed that when
the link weights are sufficiently diverse an SPE exists for
the zero-sum game between the designer and the adversary.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1: The function fij(t) is uniformly bounded
from above by
M := 4nT (||x(0)||∞ + |xavg|) ||x(0)||∞ .
Proof: By the structure of the system matrix in (1), we
can deduce that |xi − xj | cannot increase as t→ T . Thus
|xi(t)− xj(t)| ≤ max
1≤i,j≤n
|xi(0)− xj(0)|
≤ 2 max
1≤i≤n
|xi(0)| = 2 ||x(0)||∞ .
In order to bound |pi(t)−pj(t)|, we consider the interval [T−
δ, T ] where δ > 0 is small enough such that the system in
(1) is time-invariant. Let the system matrix over this interval
be A and define s := T − δ. The solution to the adjoint
dynamics in (4), (5) over [s, T ] is then given by
x(t) = eA(t−s)x(s), (12)
p(t) = 2
∫ T
t
e−A(t−τ)(x(τ)− x¯)dτ. (13)
Define the doubly stochastic matrix P (t) := eAt. Then
|pi − pj | = 2
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
t
(Pi(τ − t)− Pj(τ − t))(x(τ)− x¯)dτ
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
∫ T
t
n∑
k=1
|(Pik(τ − t)− Pjk(τ − t))(xk(τ)− x¯k)| dτ
≤ 2
∫ T
t
n∑
k=1
|xk(τ)− x¯k| dτ
≤ 2
∫ T
t
(||x(τ)||1 + n|xavg|)dτ.
Note that over [s, T ] we have ||x(t)||1 = ||P (t− s)x(s)||1 ≤
||P (t− s)||1 ||x(s)||1 = ||x(s)||1, where the last inequality
follows from the fact that P (t) is a stochastic matrix. By
repeating the above argument over the interval [0, s), after
dividing it into smaller intervals and exploiting the fact that
the solution over each small interval will be of the same
form as in (12), we conclude that ||x(t)||1 ≤ ||x(0)||1, for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. We can therefore write
|pi(t)− pj(t)| ≤ 2δ (||x(0)||1 + n|xavg|) , t ∈ [s, T ].
When we propagate the solution backward over the interval
[T−2δ, δ], a new integral term will be added to the expression
in (13); however, it will be of the same structure as that of
p(t) over [s, T ]: an integral of a doubly stochastic matrix that
depends on the system matrix over [T −2δ, T −δ] multiplied
by x(t) − x¯. This applies for all infinitesimal intervals we
consider from T − 2δ down to zero. Hence, if we subdivide
[0, T ] into K intervals of length δ and apply the triangular
inequality to |pi(t)− pj(t)|, we will obtain
|pi(t)− pj(t)| ≤ 2T (||x(0)||1 + n|xavg|) , t ∈ [0, T ].
Finally, recall that ||x(0)||1 ≤ n ||x(0)||∞. We therefore have
|fij | = |pi−pj ||xi−xj | ≤ 4nT (||x(0)||∞ + |xavg|) ||x(0)||∞ ,
as claimed.
Lemma 2: Given δ,  > 0, one can select the problem
horizon T small enough such that |fij | ≥ 2 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: We now show that |fij(t)| can be bounded below
uniformly by a positive number. In order to do so, we need to
ensure that |xi(t)−xj(t)| does not approach zero as t→ T .
We are seeking a time t? such that for a given  > 0, we have
|xi(t)−xj(t)| ≥  for all t < t? and all i, j. We can then fix
T < t? to ensure the existence of a uniform lower bound on
|xi(t)− xj(t)|. Let us again restrict our attention to a small
interval [t0, t0 + δ] where the system is time-invariant, and
let the system matrix over this interval be A. We require that
the system did not reach equilibrium over this interval, i.e.,
x(t0 + δ) 6= x¯. Without loss of generality, we assume that
x1(t0) > . . . > xn(t0)
2. Define the following dynamics
d
dt
(yi − x1(t0)) =
∑
j 6=i
Aij(x1(t0)− yi),
d
dt
(y
i
− xn(t0)) =
∑
j 6=i
Aij(xn(t0)− yi),
with initial conditions yi(t0) = 2x1(t0), yi(t0) = 2xn(t0).
Note that x˙i =
∑
j 6=iAij(xj − xi). It follows that y˙i ≤
x˙i ≤ y˙i. By the comparison principle, we conclude that yi−
xn(t0) ≤ xi ≤ yi−x1(t0), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that we can
readily find the solution trajectories for y and y. By defining
ai =
∑
j 6=iAij , we can then write
yi − x1(t0) = e−ai(t−t0)x1(t0),
y
i
− xn(t0) = e−ai(t−t0)xn(t0).
By solving the equation yi−i−x1(t0) = yi−xn(t0), we can
find a time t?i when xi−1 can potentially meet xi:
t? =
1
ai−1 − ai ln
(
x1(t0)
xn(t0)
)
+ t0.
If t?i > t0+δ, for all i, then we need to propagate the solution
forward, and keeping in mind that the system matrix could
change, until we find a time t?i in some interval [t˜, t˜ + δ]
where yi−i = yi for some i. Then, for a given  > 0, we can
select T < t? such that |xi−xi−1| ≥ |yi−yi−1| ≥ ; hence,
we conclude that for this choice of T we can guarantee that
|xi − xj | ≥  > 0 for all i, j.
Since p(T ) = 0, then |pi − pj | → 0 as t → T . Given
 > 0, there is a time T˜ij() < T such that |pi − pj | < ,
for all t ≥ T˜ij(). Define the time T˜ = min
1≤i,j≤n
T˜ij(). Then
|pi − pj | ≥  for t ≥ T˜ (), for all i, j. We therefore have
|fij | = |pi − pj ||xi − xj | ≥ 2 > 0.
2We are making the implicit assumption that x1(0) > . . . > xn(0).
